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Abstract—Protecting the network layer from malicious 
attacks is an important and challenging security issue in mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANETs). In this paper, a security mechanism 
is proposed to defend against a cooperative gray hole attack on 
the well known AODV routing protocol in MANETs. A gray hole 
is a node that selectively drops and forwards data packets after it 
advertises itself as having the shortest path to the destination 
node in response to a route request message from a source node. 
The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic 
primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it protects the 
network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of any 
node. Simulation results show that the scheme has a significantly 
high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead.  
Keywords—Mobile ad hoc networks, gray hole, routing 
misbehavior. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a group of mobile 
nodes that cooperate and forward packets for each other. Such 
networks extend the limited wireless transmission range of 
each node by multi-hop packet forwarding, and thus they are 
ideally suited for scenarios in which pre-deployed 
infrastructure support is not available. MANETs have some 
special characteristic features such as unreliable wireless links 
used for communication between hosts, constantly changing 
network topologies, limited bandwidth, battery power, low 
computation power etc. While these characteristics are essential 
for the flexibility of MANETs, they introduce specific security 
concerns that are either absent or less severe in wired networks. 
MANETs are vulnerable to various types of attacks including 
passive eavesdropping, active interfering, impersonation, and 
denial-of-service. Intrusion prevention measures such as strong 
authentication and redundant transmission should be 
complemented by detection techniques to monitor security 
status of these networks and identify malicious behavior of any 
participating node(s). One of the most critical problems in 
MANETs is the security vulnerabilities of the routing 
protocols. A set of nodes may be compromised in such a way 
that it may not be possible to detect their malicious behavior 
easily. Such nodes can generate new routing messages to 
advertise non-existent links, provide incorrect link state 
information, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus 
inflicting Byzantine failure in the network. In this paper, we 
discuss one such attack known as Gray Hole Attack on the 
widely used AODV (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector) 
routing protocol in MANETs. A mechanism is presented to 
detect and defend the network against such an attack which 
may be launched cooperatively by a set of malicious nodes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses some related work on routing security in MANETs. 
Section III defines and discusses various types of gray holes 
attacks on MANETs. Section IV describes the details of the 
proposed mechanism for detection of gray hole nodes. Section 
V presents the simulation conducted on the proposed 
mechanism and the performance analysis of the scheme. 
Section VI concludes the paper while highlighting some future 
scope of work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of security and cooperation enforcement has 
received considerable attention by researchers in the ad hoc 
network community. In this section, we discuss some of these 
works. Mechanisms for securing the routing layer of a MANET 
by cryptographic techniques are proposed by Hu et al [1], 
Papadimitratos and Hass [2], Sanzgiri et al [3] and Yang et al 
[10]. Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc networks by 
trusted certificates authorities (CAs) have been proposed by 
Zhou and Haas [4]. Hubaux et al [5] have proposed a self-
organized PGP-based scheme to authenticate nodes using 
chains of certificates and transitivity of trust. Some researchers 
have also focused on detecting and reporting misleading 
routing misbehavior of nodes. Watchdog and Pathrater [6] use 
observation-based techniques to detect misbehaving nodes and 
report observed misbehavior back to the source of the traffic. 
However, the scheme does not punish malicious nodes; instead, 
they are relieved of their packet forwarding burden. 
Researchers have also investigated means of discouraging 
selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks, generally through 
payment schemes [7]. These approaches either require the use 
of tamper-proof hardware or central bankers to do the 
accounting securely, both of which may not be appropriate in 
some truly ad hoc network scenarios. Deng, Li and Agrawal [8] 
have suggested a mechanism of defense against a black hole 
attack on AODV routing protocol. In their proposed scheme, 
when the RouteReply packet is received from one of the 
intermediate nodes, another RouteRequest is sent from the 
source node to the neighbor node of the intermediate node in 
the path. This is to check whether such a path really exists from 
the intermediate node to the destination node. While this 
scheme completely eliminates the black hole attack by a single 
attacker, it fails miserably in identifying a cooperative black 
hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes.  
         
III. GRAY HOLE ATTACK 
We first present a security vulnerability in the AODV 
protocol, and then describe different types of gray hole attacks. 
In AODV protocol, every mobile node maintains a routing 
table that stores the next hop node information for a route to a 
destination node. When a source node wishes to route a packet 
to a destination node, it uses the specified route if such a route 
is available in its routing table. Otherwise, the node initiates a 
route discovery process by broadcasting a RouteRequest 
(RREQ) message to its neighbors. On receiving a RREQ 
message, the intermediate nodes update their routing tables for 
a reverse route to the source node. All the receiving nodes that 
do not have a route to the destination node broadcast the RREQ 
packet to their neighbors. Intermediate nodes increment the hop 
count before forwarding the RREQ. A RouteReply (RREP) 
message is sent back to the source node when the RREQ query 
reaches either the destination node itself or any other node that 
has a current route to the destination.  
We now describe the gray hole attack on MANETS. The 
gray hole attack has two phases. In the first phase, a malicious 
node exploits the AODV protocol to advertise itself as having a 
valid route to a destination node, with the intention of 
intercepting packets, even though the route is spurious. In the 
second phase, the node drops the intercepted packets with a 
certain probability. This attack is more difficult to detect than 
the black hole attack where the malicious node drops the 
received data packets with certainty [8].  A gray hole may 
exhibit its malicious behavior in different ways. It may drop 
packets coming from (or destined to) certain specific node(s) in 
the network while forwarding all the packets for other nodes. 
Another type of gray hole node may behave maliciously for 
some time duration by dropping packets but may switch to 
normal behavior later. A gray hole may also exhibit a behavior 
which is a combination of the above two, thereby making its 
detection even more difficult. 
IV. PROPOSED MECHANISM 
In this section, we first mention some practical assumptions 
that have been made for formulating the network model and 
then present the proposed mechanism in detail. 
A. Network Model 
We consider a MANET consisting of similar types of 
nodes. Each node may freely roam, or remain stationary in a 
location for an arbitrary period of time. In addition, each node 
may join or leave the network, or fail at any time. The nodes 
perform peer-to-peer communication over shared, bandwidth-
constrained, error-prone, and multi-hop wireless channel. For 
the purpose of differentiation, we assume that each node has a 
unique nonzero ID. All the links in the network are assumed to 
be bi-directional. However, unlike most of the current security 
frameworks for MANETs, the proposed mechanism does not 
assume promiscuous mode of operation of the wireless 
interfaces of the nodes. The promiscuous mode may not only 
incur extra computation overhead and energy consumption in 
order to process the transit packets, but also it will not be 
feasible in cases where the nodes are equipped with directional 
antennas.  There may be varying number of gray hole nodes in 
the network at different points of time and these malicious 
nodes may cooperate with each other to disrupt the 
communication in the network. 
 
Figure 1.  Topology of a MANET  
TABLE I.  DRI  TABLE  OF NODE  7 
Node From Through RTS/CTS CheckBit 
1 0 0 15 0 
2 1 1 5 1 
6 0 1 3 0 
8 1 0 6 1 
9 0 1 4 0 
B. Different Modules of the Scheme 
The proposed mechanism involves both local and 
cooperative detection to identify any malicious gray hole node 
in the network. Once a node is detected to be really malicious, 
the scheme has a notification mechanism for sending messages 
to all the nodes that are not yet suspected to be malicious, so 
that the malicious node can be isolated and not allowed to use 
any network resources. The mechanism consists of four 
security procedures which are invoked sequentially. The 
security procedures are: (1) Neighborhood data collection, (2) 
Local anomaly detection, (3) Cooperative anomaly detection, 
and (4) Global alarm raiser. Each of these procedures is 
described in details below.  
(1) Neighborhood data collection module: Each node in the 
network collects the data forwarding information in its 
neighborhood and stores it in a table known as the Data 
Routing Information (DRI) table. The DRI table of node 7 in 
Fig. 1 is shown in Table I. In its DRI table node 7 maintains 
packet routing information of its neighbor nodes 1, 2, 6, 8, and 
9. An entry ‘1’ for a node under the column ‘From’ implies 
that node 7 has forwarded data packet coming from that node 
and an entry ‘1’ for a node under the column ‘Through’ implies 
that node 7 has forwarded data packets to that node. Thus, as 
per Table 1, node 7 has neither forwarded any data packet from 
node 1 nor it has forwarded any data packet to node 1. 
However, node 7 has forwarded data packets to node 2 and also 
has forwarded data packets that have come from node 2. In this 
way, each node constructs its DRI table and maintains it. After 
a certain threshold time interval, (this depends on the mobility 
of the network) each node identifies its neighbors with which it 
has not interacted for the purpose of data communication, and 
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invokes subsequent detection procedures to probe them further. 
This identification is done on the basis of the nodes that have 
‘0’ entries both in the ‘From’ and ‘Through’ columns in the 
DRI table. For example, as shown in Table I, node 7 has not 
communicated to node 1. Therefore, the node 7 invokes the 
local anomaly detection procedure for node 1. The ‘RTS/CTS’ 
column in the DRI table gives the ratio of the number of 
request to send (RTS) messages to the number of clear to send  
(CTS) messages for the corresponding node. This gives a rough 
idea about the number of requests arriving at the node for data 
communication and number packet transmission that the node 
is actually doing.  The significance of the column ‘CheckBit’ in 
the DRI table will be discussed in local anomaly detection 
procedure. 
TABLE II.  PROBE CHECK TABLE FOR NODE 7 
NodeID ProbeStatus 
2 0 
6 1 
8 1 
9 1 
 
(2) Local anomaly detection module: This security 
procedure is invoked by a node when it identifies a suspicious 
node by examining its DRI table as discussed above.  
We call the node that initiates the local anomaly detection 
procedure as the Initiator Node (IN). The IN first chooses a 
Cooperative Node (CN) in its neighborhood based on its DRI 
records and broadcasts a RREQ message to its 1-hop neighbors 
requesting for a route to the CN. In reply to this RREQ 
message the IN will receive a number of RREP messages from 
its neighboring nodes. It will certainly receive a RREP message 
from the Suspected Node (SN) if the latter is really a gray hole 
(since the gray holes always send RREP messages but drop 
data packets probabilistically). After receiving the RREP from 
the SN, the IN sends a probe packet to the CN through the SN. 
After the time to live (TTL) value of the probe packet is over, 
the IN enquires the CN whether it has received the probe 
packet. If the reply to this query is affirmative, (i.e., the probe 
packet is really received by the CN) then the IN updates its 
DRI table by making an entry ‘1’ under the column ‘CheckBit’ 
against the node ID of the SN. However, if the probe packet is 
found to have not reached the CN, the IN increases its level of 
suspicion about the SN and activates the cooperative anomaly 
detection procedure, as discussed later in this Section.  
In Fig. 1, node 7 acts as the IN and initiates the local 
anomaly detection procedure for the SN (node 1) and chooses 
node 2 as the CN. Node 2 is the most reliable node for node 7 
as both the entries under columns ‘From’ and ‘Through’ for 
node 2 are ‘1’. Node 7 broadcasts a RREQ message to all its 
neighbor nodes 1, 2, 6, 8 and 9 requesting them for a route to 
the CN, i.e., node 2 in the example. After receiving a RREP 
from the SN (node 1), node 7 sends a probe packet to node 2 
via node 1. Node 7 then enquires node 2 whether it has 
received the probe packet. If node 2 has received the probe 
packet, node 7 makes an entry ‘1’ under the column ‘CheckBit’ 
in its DRI table corresponding to the row of node 1. If node 2 
has not received the probe packet, then node 7 invokes the 
cooperative anomaly detection procedure. 
(3) Cooperative anomaly detection module: The objective 
of this procedure is to increase the detection reliability by 
reducing the probability of false detection of local anomaly 
detection procedure.  
This procedure is activated when an IN observes that the 
probe packet it had sent to the CN through the SN did not reach 
the CN. The IN invokes the cooperative detection procedure 
and sends a cooperative detection request message to all the 
neighbors of the SN. When the neighbors of the SN receive the 
cooperative detection request message, each of them sends a 
RREQ message to the SN requesting for a route to the IN. 
After the SN responds with a RREP message, each of the 
requesting nodes sends a ‘further probe packet’ to the IN along 
that route. This route will obviously include SN, as SN is a 
neighbor of each requesting node and the IN as well. Each 
neighbor of the SN (except the IN) now notifies the IN that a 
‘further probe packet’ has already been sent to it. This 
‘notification message’ from each neighbor is sent to the IN 
through routes which do not include the SN. This is necessary 
to ensure that the SN is not aware about the on-going cross 
checking process. The IN will receive numerous ‘further probe 
packets’ and ‘notification messages’. The IN now constructs a 
ProbeCheck table. The ProbeCheck table has two fields: 
NodeID and ProbeStatus. Under the NodeID field, the IN 
enters the identifiers of the nodes which have sent notification 
messages to it. An entry of ‘1’ is made under the column 
‘ProbeStatus’ corresponding to the nodes from which the IN 
has received the ‘further probe packet’.  
An example ProbeCheck table for node 7 of the network in 
Fig.1 is presented in Table II. It can be observed that node 7 
has received the ‘further probe packet’ from all the neighbors 
of the SN (node 1) except node 2.  There may be a possibility 
that the probe packet might have not been maliciously dropped 
by the SN, rather it has been lost because of collision or buffer 
overflow. A mathematical estimation can be made for the 
probability of collision or buffer overflow at the SN [9]. 
However, to avoid complex mathematical computation, we 
propose a simple mechanism where each node sends three 
‘further probe packets’ interspaced with a small time interval. 
If none of these three packets from a neighbor are received by 
the IN, the SN is believed to be behaving like a gray hole for 
that node during that time. This gray hole behavior may be 
exhibited for a single node (as for node 2 in Table II) or may be 
for a group of nodes.   
If the SN is found to behave like a gray hole, it is isolated 
from the network by invocation of the global alarm detection 
procedure as discussed later in this section. The frequency of 
invocation of the detection algorithm is important for ensuring 
the desired throughput in the network as a gray hole may 
quickly change its phase form ‘good’  to ‘bad’. The periodicity 
of invocation of the algorithm should be based on the 
maximum percentage of packet drop that the network 
application can afford. In the worst case, a gray hole will just 
change its phase from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ immediately after the 
invocation of one round of the detection algorithm is over and 
         
will switch back to ‘good’ phase just before the next 
invocation. Although such a situation may be quite unlikely, 
the invocation frequency should be based on the estimation of 
the number of packets that the gray hole may drop during that 
period and the maximum number of packet drops that may be 
allowed while still maintaining the desired quality of service 
(QoS). 
(4) Global alarm raising module: This procedure is invoked 
to establish a network wide notification system for sending 
alarm messages to all the nodes in the network about the gray 
hole node(s) that has been detected by the cooperative anomaly 
detection algorithm. It also ensures that the identified malicious 
node(s) is isolated so that it cannot use any network resources.  
The detection and isolation mechanism of malicious nodes 
may involve a security problem. A group of malicious nodes 
can collude together to launch a bad mouthing attack by falsely 
accusing a legitimate node and isolating it from the network. 
To prevent this, we propose a mechanism that is similar to 
threshold cryptography [4]. In the proposed mechanism, when 
a node identifies a suspected node to be malicious by 
invocation of the cooperative detection procedure, it sends a 
digitally signed (using its private key) alarm message to all its 
neighbors. The full signature is constructed when at least k 
nodes put their signatures into the alarm message. Once the 
alarm message is authenticated with the full signature, the 
suspected node is isolated from the network. Thus the proposed 
scheme is robust against collusion involving maximum   k-1 
malicious nodes in a neighborhood. When a node is finally 
identified to be malicious, its node ID will be entered into a 
global list of malicious nodes called ‘faulty list’. The faulty list 
is periodically flooded in the network, as and when an update is 
made into it.  In order to reduce the overhead, we propose two 
alternative methods of propagation of faulty list. The faulty list 
may be piggybacked with the normal routing messages (RREQ 
and RREP messages) so that it does not cause any extra 
overhead. Alternatively, each node may maintain a partial list 
of faulty nodes which are in its immediate neighborhood. This 
partial list is updated as and when the neighborhood of the 
node changes. This mechanism will be particularly suitable for 
routing protocols like AODV, as nodes need to know the 
information regarding its neighboring nodes only for routing. 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The proposed mechanism is implemented in network 
simulator ns-2 for the purpose of evaluation of its performance. 
The physical layer at each networking interface is chosen to 
approximate the Lucent WaveLAN wireless card. The MAC 
layer protocol and the routing protocol are 802.11 DCF and 
AODV respectively. An improved version of ‘random 
waypoint’ is used as the mobility mode [11]. The host pause 
time is chosen to be zero to simulate a continuously mobile 
network. Malicious gray holes are simulated using a two-phase 
Markov Chain Machine. While in the good phase none of the 
gray holes drop any packet, in the bad phase, packets are 
dropped based on a function that generates a random number 
between a maximum value (MAX_RATE) and a minimum 
value (MIN_RATE). The simulation parameters are presented 
in Table III. The metrics that are used for evaluating the 
proposed mechanism are: (1) False positive rate, i.e., the 
probability of incorrectly identifying a legitimate node as 
malicious, (2) Misdetection (false negative) rate, i.e., the 
probability of failure in detecting a malicious node, (3) Data 
packet delivery ratio, i.e., the percentage of data packets that 
are successfully delivered, and (4) Communication overhead 
due to control packets of the security algorithm. 
TABLE III.  SIMULATION  PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Simulation area 
Simulation duration 
No. of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Maximum speed of node 
Traffic type 
Total no. of flows 
Packet rate 
Data payload 
Max no. of malicious nodes 
Host pause time 
2000m * 600m 
1500 s 
50 
200 m 
Random waypoint 
20 m/s 
CBR (UDP) 
20 
2 packets/s 
512 bytes/packet 
10 
0 
 
Fig. 2 shows how false positive rate varies with mobility of 
the nodes for different percentages of gray hole nodes in the 
network. The maximum value of observed false positive rate is 
7%. The false positive rate increases as the nodes move faster. 
If a node constantly moves at a high speed, it can gather only 
partial information about its transmissions with its current 
neighbors. As a result, it is more likely to make mistakes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  False positive rate vs. nodes’ mobility 
 
Fig. 3 depicts the variation of miss-detection rate with 
nodes’ mobility for different percentages of gray hole nodes. It 
is seen that misdetection ratio is maximum (12%) in a static 
network and starts dropping with the mobility of the nodes. 
This is because in a static network if a gray hole remains in a 
sparsely populated region, its neighbors may not be able to 
punish it since there may not be requisite k number of nodes to 
arrive at the consensus. On the contrary, in a mobile network, 
the mobility increases the probability that other nodes roam 
into the region of the gray hole node(s), or the gray hole 
node(s) enters into a densely populated region. As a result, it is 
less likely that a gray hole would be able to escape without 
being detected.  
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Fig. 4 shows how the data packet delivery ratio varies with 
respect to the number of gray hole nodes for the normal AODV 
protocol and for the proposed secure routing protocol. It is 
observed that even when 20% of the nodes in the network are 
malicious gray holes, the percentage of packets successfully 
delivered is more than 90% if the proposed security protocol is 
applied. However, 100% packet delivery ratio is not achieved 
even with the proposed security mechanism. A careful analysis 
of the trace files has shown that most of the packet loss occurs 
during the detection and reaction phase of the algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Misdetection rate vs. nodes’ mobility 
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Figure 4.  Data packet delivery rate vs. No. of gray hole nodes 
 
Figure 5.  Control packet overhead for different no. of data packets 
Fig. 5 shows the communication overhead of the control 
packets of the security mechanism. We have found that with 
the increase in number of gray holes, the overhead increases. 
Therefore, we have reported the result for the worst case when 
the percentage of malicious node in the network is 20%. The 
communication overhead is shown as the percentage of the 
number of control packet required to route different number of 
data packets in the network. The normal AODV performance is 
taken as the base line. It is observed that the overhead of the 
proposed mechanism drops as the number of data packets 
transmitted is increased. This clearly demonstrates that the 
scheme is efficient in terms of communication overhead. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a mechanism for detection 
of malicious gray hole nodes in MANETs.  Due to their 
occasional misbehavior, the gray holes are very difficult to 
detect. The proposed security mechanism increases the 
reliability of detection by proactively invoking a collaborative 
and distributed algorithm involving the neighbor nodes of a 
malicious gray hole node. Detection decision works on a 
consensus algorithm based on threshold cryptography. The 
simulation results show that the mechanism is effective and 
efficient with high detection rate and very low false positive 
rate and control overhead.  
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